North Korea’s weapons industry is going global, thanks to help from Russia and China

It may not have attracted much attention in recent months with global attention focused elsewhere. But the international sanctions monitoring regime on North Korea has been disbanded, raising concerns about the unimpeded flow of North Korean weapons to global hotspots from Ukraine to Gaza.

Enforcement of United Nations sanctions against North Korea has actually been eroding for years. The final coup de grace came in March when Russia vetoed the renewal of a committee known as the Panel of Experts, which was tasked with monitoring and reporting on North Korean sanctions violations.

While UN sanctions are technically still in force, and the United States, European Union, Australia, Japan and other countries still abide by them, Russia and China do not.

With no enforcement oversight in place anymore, North Korea will now be able to ship its weapons and other black-market goods to its allies – most notably Russia, China, Iran and Syria – with less worry of repercussions.

Elaborate efforts to dodge sanctions

Since 2006, the UN has passed a number of resolutions imposing sanctions against North Korea for its nuclear program. In recent years, though, North Korea has tried to find inventive new ways to get around them.

For example, North Korea has bought a number of ships that it uses to disguise its trading activities through front companies. It operates the ships under “flags of convenience”, which arouse less suspicion in international waters, before eventually taking direct ownership of them under North Korean flags.

The Panel of Experts reported in 2023 that the time between the acquisition of the ships and the reflagging of them as North Korean has been decreasing. This means the government is expending less effort to conceal the fact the ships were purchased to conduct illicit trade.

To further facilitate its illicit trade, North Korea also continues to use Automated Identification System (AIS) spoofing for its ships. This allows its ships to transmit a false identity and/or location to law enforcement, port and trade authorities, and other ships.

The government also creates fake ship registrations to “launder”, or conceal, the true identities of its ships to evade sanctions.

In addition, North Korea’s ships are physically altered in shipyards, often in China, where they remain for months at a time.

For example, North Korean recently altered two ships (the Tomi Haru and Toyo Haru) in Chinese shipyards to conduct trade without arousing suspicion, seemingly with the help of non-North Korean firms.

The ships were owned and managed by several front companies that had Chinese nationals as their directors and were incorporated in Hong Kong and the Seychelles. After being used for suspicious trade for some time, they were later officially “acquired” by the North Korean government in early 2022.

Trading out in the open

North Korea also feels increasingly comfortable engaging with a set of countries (notably Russia and China) that will most likely not enforce sanctions.

For example, it is no longer engaging in convoluted maritime trade routes to disguise its transactions. According to Panel of Experts reports, a number of North Korea-linked ships are simply plying a direct route between North Korea and China, without any additional stops.

Brokers operating on North Korea’s behalf (particularly those in China) often trade goods for the regime without any issues.

And many of North Korea’s transactions, particularly those involving oil, are happening as ship-to-ship transfers in waters around Northeast Asia. This alleviates the need for North Korean-linked ships to use foreign ports, which is denied by UN sanctions.

While most transfers are in North Korean territorial waters, the UN Panel of Experts has reported clusters of transfers well within China’s exclusive economic zone off its eastern coast. This, again, suggests the North Koreans are unconcerned about detection.

North Korean weapons in Ukraine, Africa and the Middle East

North Korea has used this slackening of sanctions enforcement to ramp up its weapons exports and consolidate its alliances, particularly with Russia.

After North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia in September 2023, the country illegally transported some 6,700 containers (loaded with three million artillery shells) to Russia by sea and rail by February 2024, according to South Korean intelligence. It also boosted its factory output to provide new supplies to Russia.

Russia has since used a number of North Korean short-range ballistic missiles in its attacks on Ukraine. The missile components indicate they arrived via an extensive importation program facilitated by North Korea.

In early 2024, the non-governmental organisation Conflict Armament Research examined the remnants of a North Korean missile in Kharkiv, Ukraine, and discovered 290 components that reportedly came from 26 companies in eight countries. Three-quarters of those components came from the United States. The components had likely been sold to companies in third countries acting on behalf of North Korean buyers, and then re-exported to North Korea.

Now, the end of much enforcement of North Korean sanctions will enable it to further expand its buyer network.

For example, a 2024 Panel of Experts report noted meetings between representatives of KOMID (North Korea’s main weapons seller) and a Myanmar company in 2022. Meetings were also held between a North Korean diplomat in Guinea and members of the junta in neighbouring Mali to discuss building an ammunition factory in that country in 2023.

Worryingly, North Korea may also now seek to bolster its military (and potentially nuclear) relationships with Iran and Syria.

North Korean weapons were reportedly used by Hamas in its operations against Israel from October 2023 onward. These were possibly transported from Iran’s stocks.

While North Korea has long had ties with Iran, any increased access to China and Russia as stopover points for personnel and goods would enhance the country’s ability to share its military technology and know-how with Tehran.

However, the fact that Russia and China are increasingly running interference for North Korea does not necessarily mean the three countries are forming an alliance. Indeed, China is sensitive to such claims.

During the Cold War, North Korea traditionally played the Soviet Union and China off one another, taking advantage of their rivalry to extract benefits from both without being forced fully into the camp of either.

With that said, where Russian and Chinese interests are aligned vis-à-vis North Korea, there is the potential for cooperation. All three countries have a strategic interest in minimising American influence in East Asia (and globally). In this, North Korea has been able to make common cause with its friends.

Ending sanctions reporting and oversight will now allow these relationships to flourish, and for North Korea to develop its weapons export industry with less interference.