A visual guide to 14 of the drones wreaking havoc in Ukraine, Russia and beyond
- Written by Peter Layton, Visiting Fellow, Strategic Studies, Griffith University
In the past five years, uncrewed aerial vehicles (drones) have become indispensable in modern warfare. The Russia–Ukraine war has accelerated their ascent: on any given day, there may be hundreds or even thousands of drones operating across the frontlines and behind them.
Cheap, mass-produced consumer technology is the foundation for this growth. Militaries are adapting commercial designs to produce a diverse array of deadly tools.
FPV drones
In sheer numbers, first person view (FPV) drones now dominate the war. Pilots fly them by remote control, sitting in a nearby position and wearing virtual reality goggles to see through the drone’s camera.
There are also larger purpose-built machines, such as the MiS-150 quadcopter and MiS-35 hexacopter, which can carry payloads up to 15 kilograms. The in-development Buran hexacopter can carry a whopping 80kg.
The ADF operates the R70 Sky Ranger quadcopter for airbase surveillance and defence tasks.
Aircraft-style drones
Winged drones come in two broad groups: one-way (kamikaze or loitering) and reusable.
One‑way drones are used for long‑range strikes against cities, transport and infrastructure. Russia mainly uses the Geran series, which it manufactures in a giant factory 1,000km east of Moscow from designs based on Iran’s Shahed drones.
The medium-sized Geran is most common, used for long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities, transport networks, and civilian and military infrastructure.
By late June this year, Russia had fired some 29,000 Gerans, and it can now make 2,700 more each month. Simplified versions with no warhead are also used as decoys to distract air defences – not only in Ukraine, but also in Poland and Romania.
The main reusable drones are the Orlan-10 and the ZALA 421. These provide battlespace surveillance and help coordinate artillery and FPV drone strikes on Ukrainian targets.
Orlan-10s are now being also used as motherships carrying and launching smaller FPV drones.
Another reusable drone is the ZALA Lancet, used for both reconnaissance and strike missions. It is a so-called “loitering munition”: it can be launched, stay in the air for some time, identify targets with an onboard camera, and then attack if its human operator commands. More sophisticated than FPV drones, these are also far more expensive.
The ADF operates several reconnaissance drones similar to the Orlan-10: the Shadow Tactical, Wasp AE and Puma AE.
The ADF has also recently purchased some loitering munitions: the Switchblade 300 and OWL.
The ADF also operates the very large Triton maritime surveillance drone, which has no Russian equivalent, and is developing the Ghost Bat, a high-speed drone able to assist fast jet fighter and strike aircraft.
Counter-drones
Counter-drone technology is in high demand. However, drones are small, fast and numerous, which makes it inherently difficult to defend against them in a comprehensive way.
Counter-drone systems include combinations of warning sensors, backpack and vehicle-mounted electronic jammers, gun systems, surface-to-air missiles, laser devices and electromagnetic pulse systems.
FPV and multicopter drones are too small for fighter aircraft to counter them. However, larger aircraft-like drones are more vulnerable. New air-launched rocket systems now allow fighters to shoot down a dozen Gerans during each sortie.
As drones become even more widespread and diverse, the balance between cheap mass-produced attack platforms and effective, adaptable defences will shape the conflicts of the future.
Molniya: Militaer Aktuell;
Fibre optic drone: АрміяІнформ/Wikimedia;
MiS-150: Lamp of Knowledge/YouTube;
MiS-35: United24 Media;
R70-skyranger: ELP;
Geran-2: Scott Peterson/Getty Images;
Orlan-10: Mike1979 Russia/Wikimedia;
Zala 421: Airforce Technology/JSC Concern;
Zala lancet 3: Vitaly V Kuzmin;
Puma-3-AE: Naval Technology/Business Wire;
Wasp-AE: Sgt. Janine Fabre, Australian Defence. Infographics: Matt Garrow/The Conversation.
Authors: Peter Layton, Visiting Fellow, Strategic Studies, Griffith University 
