Was Ukraine’s incursion of Russia a tactical stroke of genius? It sent a strong message to Putin – and the West
- Written by: Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
Ukrainians have long become used to grim news reports from their besieged lands. But that’s suddenly changed. Following its remarkably successful incursion of Russia’s Kursk region, cheerful Ukrainian journalists are now covering the war from captured Russian territory.
Ukraine’s surprise counterpunch, taking the fight into Russia for the first time, shows no signs yet of having reached a high-water mark. Unlike previous pinprick raids by the anti-Putin Freedom of Russia Legion militia group, Ukraine’s armed forces are using some of their most seasoned units.
Having punched through a thinly defended portion of its border near the Russian city of Kursk – itself famous as a scene of one of the Soviet Union’s greatest victories against Germany in the second world war – Ukraine’s forces reportedly have captured up to 70 settlements.
In the process they’ve taken control of a piece of land encompassing some 1,000 square kilometres, up to 30 kilometres deep inside Russia.
What’s Kyiv’s endgame?
There are numerous theories about what Ukraine wants to achieve. One is that it seeks a sizeable foothold in Russia as currency to trade for captured Ukrainian territory in future peace talks. Recent signs that its forces are digging in might support that claim.
Another is that Kyiv’s goals are more modest, including holding onto key towns and road/rail hubs. That complicates Moscow’s logistics efforts and would still give Ukraine territorial chips for the negotiating table.
A third is that its forces will withdraw, having forced Moscow to secure its border by diverting significant military resources away from Ukraine.
On balance, the second two explanations are probably closer to the mark. Holding large swathes of Russian territory will be difficult for Ukraine once the Kremlin’s armed forces eventually overcome their characteristic initial inertia. Attempting to do so would permanently tie up some of Kyiv’s best soldiers, and put them at risk of death or capture.
Of course, Kyiv has other motives, too. Apart from a big morale boost for a war-weary population, Ukraine might seek to recover some of its captured soldiers. Recently, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky observed that Ukraine’s forces were “replenishing the exchange fund”.
Further, he noted, Kyiv’s decision was motivated by the desire to show Russians that the war had consequences for them – not just for Ukrainians.
The incursion is also sending a message to the United States and its NATO allies.
The White House, in particular, has dithered about allowing Ukraine to use long-range American weapons to strike Russian territory, worrying that doing so is a dangerous escalation that also plays into Russian narratives about NATO being a de facto combatant in the war.
By striking into Russian territory, Kyiv is sending a powerful reminder to Washington – deeply distracted by its upcoming presidential election – that its forces can achieve surprising results with the right capabilities.
Will the Kremlin escalate things?
Moscow’s response to the incursion, so far, lends weight to the Ukrainian argument that American escalation fears are overblown.
Regime cronies like former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev have made vague threats about vigorous punishments, and Kremlin-friendly propagandists on social media have alleged NATO troops are operating alongside Ukrainian soldiers. But that’s nothing new: Russian officials and commentators have falsely claimed for years that NATO is fighting with Ukrainian forces, and that Ukraine faces annihilation if it does not submit.
Viewed in that light, Kyiv’s move into Russia is a calculated gamble. Ukraine assesses the international, morale and material gains to sufficiently outweigh any anticipated reprisals.
Of course, that’s based on the assumption that any reprisals will be on a similar scale to those previously meted out to Ukraine. The Putin regime has routinely demonstrated it regards the laws and norms of war as inconvenient distractions, preferring instead to use fear and wanton destruction to cow its adversaries into capitulation.
But that’s also nothing Ukrainians haven’t seen before – in the slaughter of civilians at Bucha, the flattening of cities like Mariupol, the indiscriminate attacks against civilian hospitals and the veiled Russian threats about “accidents” at the occupied nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia.
Russia’s rudderless response
Tellingly, Ukraine’s incursion has again revealed the manifest failings of Russia’s armed forces. In particular, it highlights the hubris afflicting its leaders, who mistakenly believed Kyiv could fall in a mere three days. That’s now more than 900 days ago.
Many have justifiably lauded Ukraine’s preparations for its incursion as a masterpiece of operational security. It was certainly no mean feat to garner the resources necessary for a sizeable assault without tipping off either Moscow or Washington, both of which reacted initially with surprise.
However, there have been several reports that Russia’s military leadership dismissed warnings about Ukrainian troops concentrating near the border.
Since the operation began, there have been conflicting reports about who is in charge of Russia’s military response. Notionally, Valery Gerasimov – Russia’s beleaguered chief of the general staff – should be in command. Yet, Putin called the response to Ukraine’s attack a “counter-terrorism operation”, which seemed to put it within the purview of Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). Still others claim Aleksey Dyumin, a Putin favourite sometimes touted as his eventual successor, has been given the responsibility.
The confusion over command has also revealed how weak the forces remaining inside Russia are. A cobbled-together combination of conscripts, Russian naval infantry, FSB troops and Rosgvardia (Putin’s personal national guard) has been unable to dislodge the highly mobile Ukrainian forces.
After securing the town of Sudzha, the Ukrainian troops have also been able to bring in supplies and reinforcements, further complicating the job of repelling them. With the majority of Russia’s regular army tied up in Ukraine, there has even been speculation Moscow will need to relocate troops from its Kaliningrad enclave in northern Europe to help.
Putting the pressure back on Moscow
Politically, Ukraine’s move is deeply embarrassing for Putin, who has already proven himself slow to react when facing similar challenges. Just over a year ago, Moscow’s dithering allowed Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebel Wagner Group convoy to get within 200 kilometres of Moscow before an amnesty deal was brokered.
This time, Putin was forced to interrupt acting governor Alexey Smirnov during a televised meeting of defence officials, as he was delivering bad news about the depth of the Ukrainian incursion. After being curtly instructed to stick to discussing aid and relief efforts, Smirnoff promptly responded that around 180,000 Russians had been internally displaced.
Are these signs of fragility? Certainly, Russian refugees have directed significant anger at regional leaders and security forces in Kursk, some of whom seem to have been the first to flee. There are also reports of looting by Russian soldiers in the conflict zone. And there has also been criticism of Putin himself from Russians in the Kursk area.
In terms of regime stability, there are three potential outcomes.
One is that Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory – which makes a lie of the Kremlin’s consistent leitmotif about keeping Russians safe – leads to a torrent of public anger that directly endangers Putin’s rule.
Second, Putin could turn the insult of Ukrainians capturing Russian soil into a rallying cry, uniting the population behind him.
The third option, however, might be most likely – the majority of Russians remain apathetic. There is still no real incentive for Kremlin elites to move against Putin, and popular outrage is likely to be confined to Kursk rather than the power centres of Moscow and St Petersburg.
Ultimately, Ukraine’s incursion into Russia goes beyond damaging Putin. It has boosted morale, shown up the Kremlin’s bluster and reminded the West that Ukraine matters. On all three measures, Kyiv has once again proven itself remarkably resourceful.
Authors: Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
