America’s interests matter more than any set of rules
- Written by John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
Last week in Europe, the United States sent some very strong messages it is prepared to upend the established global order.
US Vice President JD Vance warned a stunned Munich Security Conference that Europe has an “enemy within”, referring to leaders who ignore their citizens’ concerns and values. He also advocated for right-wing political groups to be brought into the mainstream.
Meanwhile, at a meeting of NATO defence ministers, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth talked about hard power, the warrior ethos and the need for NATO members to spend up to 5% of their GDPs on defence. Most have only just climbed to about 2%, the longstanding NATO guideline.
In Poland, he reaffirmed the US commitment to the defence of Poland (and NATO) and committed to bolstering the US military presence there. So, despite the mixed messaging, the United States is not leaving Europe anytime soon.
Meanwhile, President Donald Trump is reportedly demanding a significant levy from Ukraine as payback for US protection and support.
The combination of remarks has left pundits and policymakers wondering – is the US-led international order, with its multilateral institutions, nearing its end?
The demise of the rules-based order?
The United States played a leading role in establishing the rules-based international order from the ashes of the second world war.
Critics have decried the UN-related institutions that arose at this time. But the rules-based order is perhaps best viewed as Voltaire saw the Holy Roman Empire: “no way holy, nor Roman, nor an empire”. Those proclaiming the demise of the rules-based order should be careful what they wish for.
Such a system of trusted international exchanges barely existed prior to 1945. And while superpowers have carved out many exceptions for themselves, the rules-based order has nonetheless resulted in a time of remarkable stability and prosperity for the world.
So, why would the United States now appear to be retreating from this arrangement? The declining centrality of US influence goes some way to explain this.
China’s rise and the rise of Trump
To place the current events in proper context, we need to go back 25 years, when China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
This move was supported by and facilitated by then US President Bill Clinton in a belief that market liberalisation would eventually lead to political liberalisation.
Since then, China’s growth has skyrocketed thanks to its ready access to global markets. But it’s retained a strong mercantilist approach, counter to the spirit of the WTO. This has generated much resentment and nervousness among Western powers about the changing global power balance.
US President Bill Clinton waves to the Chinese public on a visit to Shanghai in July 1998.
AP Photo/Greg Baker
Since Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, in particular, China has taken on an adversarial position to the rules-based order, following its own set of rules.
In effect, the world got neither the political nor the trade liberalisation that it once sought from China. Rather, the rules as they applied in China (and to an extent in Russia) allowed state-owned enterprises to co-opt – if not outright steal – technology shared by their international industry partners.
Foreign companies were squeezed out of China and had difficulty competing with lower-priced Chinese products at home.
Trump’s rise is, in part, a reaction to these developments. During his first term from 2017–20, Trump fitfully attempted to take a retaliatory, transactional approach to international relations. Now, as he begins his second term, he has a much more clear-eyed plan of action.
What Trump expects now
What became startlingly clear at the Munich Security Conference was Trump’s new vision of transactional alliances with America’s traditional partners.
In his view, the United States is not so much retreating into isolationism as much as it’s acting as a great power with its own economic interests at heart. Trump is eager for the US to assert its place in a world where spheres of influence matter as much – if not more – than any particular set of rules.
Evidently, the US is no longer advocating for multilateralism, in which states cooperate as equals. Now, it’s focused more on multi-polarity – a world with several great powers, in which the US puts its own interests first. As Trump frequently reminds us, “America First”.
According to this world view, allies and adversaries have equally been taking unfair advantage of:
- America’s famous openness (notably its borders)
- its liberal trade policies (which, according to Trump, has led to the de-industrialisation of the American heartland).
Its allies have also taken advantage of the generosity of its security umbrella, leading to their cavalier approach to security.
The Trump administration’s remedy to all of this involves doling out sanctimonious advice. An example of this: Vance telling European allies they should unwind their relaxed immigration policies.
JD Vance’s speech to the Munich Security Conference.It’s also doling out some tough medicine, apparently trying to provoke a reaction in European capitals so they significantly increase their defence spending. This would enable the US to step back from being Europe’s security guarantor and finally undertake its long-talked-about pivot to Asia and focus on its main adversary: China.
Russia evidently features as part of this plan. Trump appears intent to try to cleave Russia from its Chinese embrace in order to either isolate or weaken China. A hard-nosed deal with Russia over Ukraine may well be the price he’s willing to pay to make that happen.
For America’s close security and economic partners, this presents an unprecedented challenge. The old preconceptions and expectations no longer seem to apply. What’s important now is not so much America’s shared values with Europe, it’s their overlapping interests.
For America’s allies, as well as its adversaries, this is going to require some hard thinking and new strategies, both economically and militarily.
Authors: John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
